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Over the past few years, the discussion among academics and central bankers about the relationship 
between monetary and financial stability has intensified. The discussion has particularly focused on 
whether inflation targeting is consistent with financial stability, and if an inflation targeting regime 
contributes to financial stability. Furthermore, is there a conflict between monetary and financial 
stability, and if so, in what situations do such conflicts typically occur?
2 
The traditional view has been that a monetary policy regime preserving low and stable inflation tends 
to facilitate financial stability. Low and stable inflation provides households and enterprises with a clear 
indication of changes in relative prices, thereby making it easier for economic agents to make the 
correct decisions. Low and stable consumer price inflation also contributes to price stability in financial 
and property markets. An unexpected decline in inflation increases the real value of outstanding debt, 
making defaults more likely. Furthermore, the vulnerability of the financial system tends to rise when 
inflation is high, particularly if monetary policy needs to be tightened significantly to reduce inflation or 
restore economic stability. Hence, the traditional view has been that low and stable inflation provides a 
sound foundation for financial stability and that the two objectives normally underpin each other. 
However, financial imbalances can build up in a low-inflation environment. This relates to the fact that 
high credibility in the policymakers’ commitment to price stability, or stable inflation expectations, may 
enhance price rigidity at the mean level. As a result, overall inflation may be under control even in a 
macroeconomic environment with high and increasing demand, and where demand pressure results in 
higher asset prices and credit growth. The same may ensue from supply side developments putting 
downward pressure on prices. 
It has therefore been argued that inflation targeters should more explicitly consider developments in 
financial variables such as equity and bond prices, credit and property prices when setting interest 
rates. Some argue that central banks’ key interest rates should also respond to these variables in 
situations where inflation pressures seem to be under control. 
Financial imbalances may build up in a low-inflation environment without threatening the inflation 
target in the short to medium term. However, these imbalances may be a threat to nominal stability in 
the somewhat longer run when a burst of the bubble could imply strong deflationary pressure and 
bring inflation below target. Consequently, it has been argued that monetary policy in some situations 
should adopt a somewhat longer policy horizon allowing inflation to undershoot the target for some 
time in order to dampen credit growth and the rise in asset prices and thus reduce the risk of a burst of 
the bubble which may threaten an even more substantial undershoot of the inflation target in the 
future. The build-up of financial imbalances may also constrain the use of monetary policy. High levels 
of debt and overvalued asset prices may prevent the central bank from taking adequate steps 
because of the risk of turmoil in the financial sector. 
                                                       
1  Arild J Lund and Kjell B Nordal work in the Financial Analysis and Structure Department, Norges Bank (Central Bank of 
Norway). Snorre Evjen, Kjersti Haare Morka and Ingvild Svendsen work in the Monetary Policy Department, Norges Bank. 
Questions concerning the paper can be addressed to: Arild-J.Lund@norges-bank.no or Ingvild.Svendsen@norges-bank.no. 
The views expressed are those of the authors, and do not necessarily represent those of Norges Bank. We would like to 
thank Eivind Bernhardsen, Kjersti-Gro Lindquist and conference participants for helpful comments and discussions. 
2  See for instance Bernanke and Gertler (1999), Borio and Lowe (2002), Cecchetti et al (2000) and Borio et al (2003).  
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The costs to society associated with a crisis in the financial system can be large. But keeping inflation 
below the target for a certain period also involves costs. In some cases, substantial increases in 
interest rates may be required in order to curb the build-up of financial imbalances. Unemployment 
may rise, inflation expectations may fall below target and central bank credibility may be jeopardised. 
Furthermore, not all situations involving a build-up of financial imbalances result in financial crisis. We 
therefore need good indicators to show whether financial imbalances are emerging and the danger 
they impose on the macroeconomic balance. Some promising steps have been taken in this field.
3 
The aim of this paper is (1) to investigate the effects on financial institutions’ losses of different 
monetary responses to supply and demand side shocks and discuss how stress tests may assist in 
monetary policymaking, and (2) to present the model used to conduct the stress tests. 
The paper is organised as follows: we first discuss important characteristics of macroeconomic stress 
tests. In Section 3, we present the methodology, ie how the stress tests are implemented. In Section 4, 
the results of the stress tests are presented and discussed. The major findings are discussed in 
Section 5. 
2.  Macroeconomic stress tests of the Norwegian financial sector 
In essence, a stress test is a what-if analysis. What-if analyses are undertaken to gain an insight into 
the mechanisms of the economy by analysing the effects of certain shocks to the economy. In this 
paper we focus on shocks in demand and wage growth and study the impact on banks’ loan losses of 
different monetary policy responses. This may be viewed as a post-shock analysis. The results from 
these analyses are particularly relevant to monetary policymaking in an ex ante perspective if they 
give insight into how today’s monetary policy decision influences the probability and nature of future 
instability in the financial sector. 
Financial stability is often defined as the absence of financial instability. Financial instability is typically 
characterised by large and abrupt changes in property prices and securities markets and by financial 
institutions or financial markets that do not function adequately. Disturbances occur in the credit supply 
or in the flow of capital. In most cases, this will have consequences for output, employment and 
inflation. 
Increases in banks’ provisioning for bad debt may be used as an indicator of the degree of financial 
stability. This indicator typically summarises the financial situation for both households and enterprises 
and their implications for the financial sector. The macroeconomic environment is crucial for the debt 
servicing capacity of households and enterprises and for the level of prices of those assets which often 
serve as collateral. Macroeconomic shocks have an impact on these variables and hence on banks’ 
loan loss provisioning. 
We apply macroeconomic stress testing to illustrate the financial sector’s robustness to adverse 
macroeconomic shocks and to analyse whether a monetary policy reaction to the same shocks will 
mitigate or amplify banks’ credit losses. The stress test approach in Norges Bank is model based. 
Output from a macroeconomic model - the RIMINI model of Norges Bank
4 - is used as input when 
forecasting loss provisioning. Losses are forecast separately for the household sector and the 
corporate sector. For the corporate sector, a micro model, based on firms’ accounts, is used. 
Combining predicted bankruptcy probabilities with information about each firm’s bank loans and 
general property prices as a proxy for the value of the collateral enables us to compute expected bank 
losses at an aggregate level. The variation in risk structure across lenders is explicitly taken into 
account. For the household sector, we use a single loan loss function where loan losses depend on 
the initial debt to income ratio, the level of interest rates and the unemployment rate. The methodology 
is described in Section 3. 
                                                       
3  See Borio and Lowe (2002). 
4  See Eitrheim and Gulbrandsen (2001) and Olsen and Wulfsberg (2001) for an overview of key aspects of the model.  
BIS Papers No 22  411
 
We consider both a demand and a supply shock. The demand shock stems from a sudden drop in 
public spending, while a strong rise in wage costs is the source of the supply side shock. We model 
the shocks with and without a monetary policy response. For simplicity, we chose to model the 
monetary response by a standard Taylor rule.
5 According to the Taylor rule, the interest rate is set as a 
function of the neutral long-term rate of interest, excess production (the output gap) and excess 
inflation (the inflation gap). In a situation where inflation is on target and the output gap is zero, the 
Taylor rule interest rate will be equal to the neutral nominal interest rate (the neutral real interest rate 
plus the inflation target); see Taylor (1993). We have applied a backward-looking Taylor rule, which 
normally gives a somewhat slower monetary policy reaction than forward-looking rules.
6 The scenarios 
with a Taylor rule response are compared with scenarios without a monetary policy reaction 
(ie monetary policy as in the reference scenario). Few, if any, inflation targeting central banks follow a 
Taylor rule. However, a Taylor rule has in many cases proved to be useful as an empirical description 
of an inflation targeting regime. 
Stress tests at two different points in time 
The initial situation for enterprises and households is important. For the individual households and 
enterprises, their ability to service their loan is a result of both the general economic situation and 
individual characteristics. 
We have stress-tested the economy at two different points in time, in 1996 and 2001. The purpose is 
to see how different economic conditions influence the impact of the shocks. In particular, we are 
interested in situations with different levels of indebtedness and different levels of asset prices. The 
vulnerability of the household sector to increases in the unemployment rate depends positively on the 
initial debt burden and how debt is dispersed among different groups of households. In general, a 
firm’s bankruptcy probability, given a drop in new orders, depends on operating income and expenses, 
own funds, debt structure and other individual characteristics. 
In 1996, the macroeconomic environment in Norway was relatively balanced. Around three years of 
growth above trend had closed a negative output gap. Inflation seemed to be under control. 
Norwegian enterprises had gradually built up their capital reserves. The level of debt and asset prices 
was low. The banking crisis was over. We would have expected the financial system to be quite robust 
if faced with a negative shock to the economy. 
The latest observation in the dataset of Norwegian enterprises’ accounts is 2001. The situation for 
enterprises and households that year is comparable to their financial situation today, although the 
macro fundamentals and corporate key variables have changed negatively from 2001 to 2003. 
In  2001, capacity utilisation in the Norwegian economy was very high after several years of high 
growth. The financial situation of the corporate sector was still very sound, but the indebtedness of 
firms had increased compared to 1996. Also the indebtedness of the household sector had increased, 
but to a lesser extent. House prices had risen considerably. See Table 1 for a summary of key 
variables in 1996 and 2001. 
 
                                                       
5  The Taylor-rule applied: t t t y i i ⋅ + π − π ⋅ + = 5 . 0 ) * ( 5 . 1 * .  t y  is output gap at time t, i is the nominal interest rate, π is inflation, 
π* is the inflation target and i* the neutral real interest rate. 
6  It should be noted that assuming a Taylor rule is completely different from actual monetary policy in Norway in the 1990s. In 
the 1990s monetary policy aimed at stabilising the exchange rate. Since March 2001, the government has defined an 
inflation target for monetary policy in Norway. The operational objective is an inflation rate of 2½% over time. See 
www.norges-bank.no for more information about Norwegian monetary policy.  
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Table 1 
Summary of key variables describing the state 
of the Norwegian economy and the corporate 
and financial sectors in 1996 and 2001 
Per cent 
 1996  2001 
Macroeconomics    
GDP growth (mainland economy)    4.2    1.7 
Output  gap   0  2 
Unemployment rate (registered)    4.2    2.7 
Annual  wage  growth   4.4   5.8 
CPI  inflation   1.2   3.0 
Households    
Credit growth     4.8    10.4 
House prices, annual rise    9.1    7.3 
Interest rate on loans    7.2    8.9 
Annual real disposable income growth    3.4    0.5 
Saving  ratio   2.3   4.0 
Enterprises
1    
Return on capital    9.1    6.3 
Return on equity  20.0    7.3 
Interest  paid/debt   4.3   5.8 
Equity  ratio   30.7   34.3 
Growth in bank debt    1.3    2.9 
Banks
2    
Return on equity    17.5    12.0 
Non-performing loans/gross loans    3.0    1.3 
Equity/total  capital   6.5   6.5 
Tier 1 and 2 capital/risk-weighted assets    12.9  12.6 
Tier 1 capital/risk-weighted assets    9.9    9.7 
1  Information based on accounts for all joint stock companies.   
2  The numbers apply to Norwegian banks. Norwegian banks’ 
branches abroad are not included. 
Sources: Norges Bank; Statistics Norway. 
 
3.  The methodology used to estimate loan losses 
Estimation of losses on loans to both the household and corporate sectors is based on 
macroeconomic variables such as GDP growth, wage growth, interest rates and changes in house 
prices; see Figure 1. The macroeconomic variables reflect the interaction between firms and 
households as both sectors are included in the macroeconomic model RIMINI. There is, however, no 
feedback from estimated bank losses to the macroeconomic scenario.  
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Figure 1 
Outline of methodology used to calculate loan losses 
 
For a lender, the expected loss on a portfolio of loans is the product of the probability of default or 
bankruptcy, the borrower’s outstanding debt and the level of loss in the event of default or 
bankruptcy.
7 The probability of bankruptcy, debt and loss-given-default is a function of both 
macroeconomic developments and microeconomic conditions associated with the individual borrower. 
To analyse loan losses, all these factors should be assessed. 
Losses are estimated separately for the household and corporate sectors. These sectors have specific 
risk characteristics and they are treated as different segments by financial institutions.  
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Household sector 
The model for financial institutions’ provisioning for bad debt in the household sector is solely based 
on macroeconomic variables. The equation for losses in per cent of outstanding debt, LOSSREL, is 
given by 
t t t t t t DUM UMP R rhous dburd lossrel 97 05 . 7 55 . 31 55 . 13 45 . 1 31 . 3 − + + − =  (1) 
where dburd is the debt burden measured as debt in per cent of disposable income, rhous is the real 
value of private houses, R is the interest rate, and UMP is the unemployment rate. The use of lower 
case letters indicates that the variables are in logarithmic form. Equation (1) is estimated on actual 
losses for the time period 1978-2001. For the model summary, see Appendix 1. 
The partial effects of the variables on provisioning are intuitive. An increase in the debt burden, higher 
unemployment and higher interest rates increase financial institutions’ losses. Losses may also 
increase as a result of reduced values of private houses, which result in lower values of collateral. 
This analysis does not reflect the fact that households are a heterogeneous group. Debt burden, 
for  example, varies widely across income deciles in the household sector and has developed 
differently over time. This implies that changes in interest rates may have a very different effect on 
households in different income deciles. In a more micro-based approach, financial institutions’ loan 
losses could be modelled for the various income categories in the household sector. 
Corporate sector 
The provisioning for bad debt in the corporate sector is modelled according to the equation 
t t t rph rwd loss ∆ − = − 34 . 13 95 . 0 1 , (2) 
where LOSS is financial institutions’ losses on loans to enterprises, RWD is the sum of risk-weighted 
debt for all enterprises and RPH
8 is the real price of existing dwellings.
9 The collateral pledged by 
enterprises to lenders consists mainly of real estate, operating assets and inventories. Information 
about the realisation value of these assets is, however, not available. The annual change in real house 
prices is therefore used as a proxy for the change in the realisation value of the lenders’ collateral. 
According to equation (2), a 1% increase in risk-weighted debt will increase loan losses by 0.95%. A 
1 percentage point reduction in the value of financial institutions’ collateral will increase losses by 13%. 
Risk-weighted debt for a company is defined as the product of the company’s debt and its bankruptcy 
probability. It is an estimate of how much the lender can expect to lose in the absence of collateral. 
The risk-weighted debt will vary across firms according to the level of their debt, and according to their 
individual bankruptcy probabilities. The bankruptcy probabilities are estimated using Norges Bank’s 
bankruptcy prediction model (SEBRA). For a description of the model, see Appendix 2. In SEBRA, the 
bankruptcy probabilities are a function of selected accounting variables (operating income, operating 
expenses, interest expenses, long-term debt and overdraft debt), company age and size and industry 
characteristics.  
For actual and modelled losses in per cent of outstanding debt in Norway for the years 1989-2002, 
see Figure 2. This period covers the peak of the banking crisis in 1990-92, the following consolidation 
phase and the recent period from 2001 with increasing losses. The modelled losses are based on 
historical figures. 
                                                       
8 The  variable  RPH is an output from RIMINI in the stress tests. 
9  Lower case letters indicate logarithmic form and ∆ indicates the first difference of the variable.  
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Figure 2 
Losses as a percentage of debt, by sector and aggregate  





























For the corporate sector, risk-weighted debt is computed in three steps. First, each company’s annual 
accounts are projected for the scenario period. This is done by assuming that key revenue and 
expense items in the accounts will vary in tandem with estimated changes in key macroeconomic 
variables. See Table 2 for a summary of the modelled relationship between macro and accounting 
variables.  
Second, a bankruptcy probability is estimated for each company based on the projected accounts. 
Finally the risk-weighted debt for all companies is computed and aggregated.  
The heterogeneity between companies is reflected in the variable risk-weighted debt. Risk-weighted 
debt is computed based on actual accounting figures. Hence, sectoral and regional differences in the 
profitability, liquidity and solvency of individual firms are reflected in their bankruptcy probabilities. 
Differences in debt growth between companies will also be reflected in the aggregate. 
 
Table 2 
Modelled relationship between accounting 
variables for companies and macro variables 
  Accounting variable (at the company level)  Macro variable (output from RIMINI) 
1    Operating income    Mainland GDP 
2    Operating expenses excl wage expenses    Mainland GDP 
3   Wage  expenses    Wages 
4   Interest  expenses   Interest  rate 
5    Long-term debt and overdraft debt   
Variables 1-3 in the left-hand column are assumed to have the same yearly percentage increase (decrease) as the 
accompanying macro variables in the right hand column. Variable 4 is based on the level of the interest rate. Variable 5 is not 
an output of the RIMINI model. 
 
However, some of this heterogeneity is lost when we project the accounts for the scenario period as 
we assume that all companies develop similarly. As an example, consider the case of operating 
income. The percentage growth in operating income will be equal to the growth in mainland GDP, 
irrespective of the industry. The year prior to the first scenario year also influences the projections. If a 
company has a particularly low operating income in the year in question, the results for the whole 
Loss provisions - households 
Per cent of debt 
Loss provisions - enterprises
Per cent of debt 
Loss provisions -  
households and enterprises
Per cent of debt 
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scenario will be influenced. The simplified modelling of company accounts is motivated by tractability. 
We do not, however, lose all the heterogeneity between companies. The debt and bankruptcy 
probability is still computed for each company individually. 
4.  Stress test results 
4.1  The macroeconomic demand side shock  
We study the impact on banks’ loan losses of a considerable adverse macroeconomic demand side 
shock, initiated by a significant decline in public expenditure. Public consumption and investments are 
reduced permanently by 6 percentage points compared to a reference scenario. Note that the 
reference scenario that has been used to calculate the changes in macro variables due to the shocks 
is the forecast presented in Norges Bank’s inflation report at that time, and not the actual outcome. 
This drop in demand leads to a reduction in public sector employment, which also gives rise to other 
changes in the macroeconomic environment. In the scenario with no monetary policy response, the 
unemployment rate increases by around 1.5 percentage points in the first year, and after three years it 
is 2-2.5 percentage points higher than the unemployment rate in the reference scenario. Furthermore, 
we assume that these changes are followed by a decrease in the rise in house prices of around 
10 percentage points per year in the first two of the three years involved in the forecasts, which means 
that house prices actually fall. Moreover, the inflation rate drops by 1 percentage point compared to 
the reference scenario after two years and 1.5 percentage points after three years. As these shocks 
yield substantial effects on both inflation and aggregate output, the results from no monetary response 
and a Taylor rule response are expected to be appreciably different. The results, which are 
summarised in Tables 3 and 4, show that monetary policy easing according to a Taylor rule mitigates 
the negative effects of the demand shock on the variables presented. 
The shocks illustrated in this analysis are substantial. However, they are probably not necessarily 
unrealistic. The substantial macroeconomic instability and volatility experienced in the 1980s illustrate 
that large oscillations in macroeconomic variables can occur. For example, house prices in Norway fell 
by almost 30% from early 1988 to early 1993. The unemployment rate was 2% cent in 1986/87, before 
it increased and reached around 6% in 1993; see Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3 
Unemployment rate (per cent) and 


















Unemployment rate (LFS), 
left-hand scale 
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Table 3 
Demand shock with no monetary policy response
1 
 
t + 1  t + 2  t + 3 
Macroeconomic variables      
Mainland GDP   –2.5  –2.0  –1.7 
Unemployment rate (change in level, 
percentage points)  +1.3  +1.8  +2.2 
Wages –0.3  –1.8  –2.0 
CPI –0.2  –1.0  –1.6 
Household variables      
Credit growth households  –0.2  –2.8  –4.6 
House prices   –10.0  –10.0  0.0 
Value of house capital   –10.0  –10.0  0.0 
Interest rate on loans (change in 
level, percentage points)  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Interest expenses   0.0  –2.0  –4.7 
Disposable income  –2.8  –1.9  –2.2 




Demand shock with monetary policy 
response according to a Taylor rule
1 
 
t + 1  t + 2  t + 3 
Macroeconomic variables     
Mainland GDP   –2.3  –0.8  +0.3 
Unemployment rate (change in level, 
percentage points)  +1.3  +1.7  +1.8 
Wages –0.4  –1.7  –1.6 
CPI –0.2  –0.9  –1.3 
Household variables      
Credit growth households  –0.2  –1.9  –2.3 
House prices   –9.0  –7.0  +3.0 
Value of house capital   –9.0  –7.0  +3.0 
Interest rate on loans (change in 
level, percentage points)  –0.9  –2.8  –3.5 
Interest expenses   –10.0  –32.2  –8.2 
Disposable income  –2.5  –1.1  –1.2 
1  Effect on growth rates (percentage points) unless otherwise stated. Shock occurs in year t + 1.  
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A motivation for a shock initiated by a drop in public spending could for example be the fact that 
approximately 25% of the Norwegian government’s revenues stem from petroleum activities.
10 A large 
drop in the oil price that is perceived by policymakers as permanent could enforce a reduction in public 
sector expenses in order to balance the expected public revenues and expenses in the longer term.
11 
Loan losses with the demand side shock 
Estimated losses for households in the cases involving demand shocks are higher than estimated 
losses in the baseline scenario; see Figure 4. The household sector is hit by the demand shock in 
the  form of increased unemployment, reduced growth in disposable income and a reduction in 
households’ housing wealth. These factors contribute to higher losses on loans to households. The 
monetary response partly reverses the changes in unemployment, disposable income and housing 
wealth. The net effect is that losses are higher compared to the baseline scenario, but lower than in 
the case with no monetary response. 
Also, estimated losses in the corporate sector increase with the demand shock; see Figure 5. Losses 
in the corporate sector are larger than losses in the household sector. As expected, corporate loans 
are more risky. The effect of the demand side shock on the corporate sector’s risk-weighted debt only 
influences estimated losses in years two and three of the scenarios. The reason is that risk-weighted 
debt is lagged by one year in the loan loss equation.  
The demand effect of the demand side shock on the value of collateral, proxied by the change in value 
of housing, is negative and causes losses to increase in 1996 and 2001. Higher risk-weighted debt 
and a further fall in house prices contribute to increased losses in year two of the scenarios. In the final 
year, estimated losses fall. This is primarily due to a stabilisation of property prices. 
The average bankruptcy probabilities for the different shocks, ie, risk-weighted debt per unit of debt, 
are illustrated in Figure 7. The demand shock increases risk-weighted debt primarily because it 
reduces sales in the corporate sector. Low wage growth contributes to a reduction in risk-weighted 
debt, but this effect is not sufficiently strong to dominate the effect of the sector’s fall in revenues.  
The monetary policy response according to the Taylor rule reduces the fall in property prices, thereby 
reducing the losses in the first year of the scenarios. The growth in risk-weighted debt is reduced, 
contributing to reduced losses in years two and three of the scenarios.  
Risk-weighted debt increases more slowly because of lower interest rates and because of the smaller 
reduction in sales. These positive effects are not outweighed by the smaller decrease in wage growth. 
Estimated losses in the cases involving demand shocks are higher than estimated losses in the 
baseline scenario in both sectors. Applying a Taylor rule for monetary policy implies reduced losses in 
both the household and corporate sector. Hence, with a demand shock, there is no conflict between 
inflation targeting and financial stability. 
4.2  The macroeconomic supply side shock 
If the economy is hit by a cost-push shock, there may be a trade-off between stabilising output and 
stabilising inflation. As often illustrated in the inflation targeting literature, a cost-push shock may lead 
to an increase in both inflation and unemployment. A tightened monetary policy aiming at stabilising 
inflation will then lead to a further increase in unemployment. Such a monetary policy reaction 
increases the burden on the financial system, due to both increased interest rates and an extra 
reduction in employment. 
We have analysed the effects on banks’ losses of a macroeconomic supply side shock. In this 
scenario, growth in annual wages increases by 4 percentage points per year compared to the baseline 
scenario. The results are summarised in Tables 5 and 6. 
                                                       
10  Estimate for 2003; see the Government’s Revised National Budget 2003 (Ministry of Finance). 
11  According to the fiscal policy rule in Norway, over time, the use of petroleum revenues over the government budget should 
be equal to the expected real return on the capital of the Petroleum Fund, stipulated at 4% per annum. Hence, a substantial 
fall in oil prices that is perceived as permanent will probably lead to a reduction in public spending.  
BIS Papers No 22  419
 
The increase in wages leads to higher consumer price inflation. This is a result of both higher costs for 
enterprises/employers and higher domestic demand. In the short term, ie within a two-year horizon, 
higher wages lead to higher private consumption. Consequently, GDP growth increases. In turn, 
higher demand and production lead to lower unemployment. Usually, in the literature, a positive cost-
push shock leads to an increase in both inflation and unemployment. When we as a result get an 
increase in inflation but a fall in unemployment, it is a result of the way we have designed the shock 
(ie as a wage shock) and a quite strong link from wage growth to private consumption in our model. In 
addition, expectations are not explicitly modelled, and households’ and firms’ current decisions are not 
affected by the long-run consequences of higher wage growth. 
In the longer term, one would expect a wage shock to cause a deterioration in conditions for 
enterprises. As wage costs rise dramatically, many enterprises will be forced to cut back on their 
stocks of employees. In addition, the bankruptcy rate would increase. It normally takes some time 
before these effects on employment are exhausted. In a perspective of about one year, it is not clear 
whether the positive aggregate demand effect or the negative cost effect of a large wage rise 
dominates. In our scenarios, the total effect on employment from such a wage shock is slightly 
negative after two years, so that unemployment is higher. In the longer term we would expect the 
negative effects on employment to dominate more clearly. (A parallel to this is the situation in Norway 
where wage growth was high in the period 1998-2002. This has probably had a negative impact on 
employment growth, especially in the internationally exposed industries.) 
 
Table 5 
Supply shock with no monetary policy response
1 
 
t + 1  t + 2  t + 3 
Macroeconomic variables      
Mainland GDP   +0.2  +1.0  +1.6 
Unemployment rate (change in level, 
percentage points)  0.0  +0.3  +0.5 
Wages  +4.0  +4.0  +4.0 
CPI  +0.6  +2.2  +2.3 
Household variables     
Credit growth households  +0.1  +1.0  +2.1 
House prices   +1.2  +4.3  +5.5 
Value of house capital   +1.2  +4.4  +5.8 
Interest rate on loans (change in 
level, percentage points)  0.0 0.0 0.0 
Interest expenses   0.0  +0.7  +2.0 
Disposable income  +3.0  +3.3  +3.4 
1  Effect on growth rates (percentage points) unless otherwise stated. Shock occurs in year t + 1.  




Supply shock with monetary policy 
response according to a Taylor rule
1 
 
t + 1  t + 2  t + 3 
Macroeconomic variables      
Mainland GDP    + 0.3   –0.1   + 0.1 
Unemployment rate (change in level, 
percentage points)    0.0   + 0.4   + 1.0 
Wages   + 4.0   + 3.0   + 2.0 
CPI   + 0.6   + 2.0   + 1.4 
Household variables     
Credit growth households   + 0.1   + 0.2   –0.8 
House prices     0.0    –1.4   + 2.4 
Value of house capital     0.0    –1.5   + 2.3 
Interest rate on loans (change in level, 
percentage points)   + 0.7   + 3.0   + 2.3 
Interest expenses    + 7.7  +36.5  –13.1 
Disposable income   + 2.8   + 1.7   + 1.6 
1  Effect on growth rates (percentage points) unless otherwise stated. Shock occurs in year t + 1. 
Moreover, in the scenario with no monetary policy response, the rise in wages contributes to higher 
house prices. This increases the value of the collateral of banks, which in turn reduces banks’ losses.  
Under inflation targeting, a sudden increase in labour costs will prompt an increase in interest rates to 
counteract the build-up of inflationary pressures. If the response pattern of the central bank is well 
known, we expect the monetary policy regime to have a disciplinary effect on wage growth. The labour 
unions will foresee that high wage growth results in higher inflation and then higher interest rates, 
reducing the disposable income of households with debt. Higher interest rates will typically lead to an 
appreciation of the krone, with a further reduction in earnings and employment for the exposed 
businesses. In line with these arguments, we have assumed in our cost-push scenario with a 
monetary policy reaction that the central bank’s response pattern is gradually internalised by trade 
unions. When a Taylor-rule monetary policy response is implemented, we assume that wage growth 
only increases relative to the reference scenario by 4 percentage points the first year, 3 percentage 
points in the second, and 2 percentage points in the third year (see Table 6).  
As wage increases lead to higher inflation, the Taylor rule yields higher interest rates. This in turn 
curbs aggregate demand and house prices. Unemployment increases. 
Loan losses in the supply side shock case 
The supply shock causes a reduction in estimated losses compared to the baseline scenario in the 
household sector; see Figure 4. Higher wage growth increases disposable income and house prices. 
The effect of these positive factors is not reversed by the increase in unemployment. 
The monetary policy response causes higher interest rates, increased unemployment and a more 
moderate development in housing wealth in the household sector. Due to the hike in interest rates, 
house prices fall in year two, relative to the reference scenario. The result is that losses increase. The 
level of estimated loss is higher than the loss in the baseline scenario.  
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The supply shock causes a reduction in estimated corporate losses compared to the baseline 
scenario; see Figure 5. With a Taylor-type monetary policy response, losses increase to a level above 
the losses in the baseline scenarios. 
The supply shock increases risk-weighted debt because of the large increase in companies’ wage 
costs. The increase in wages is, however, also accompanied by an increase in sales, but the increase 
in wages dominates the latter effect. Risk-weighted debt increases and contributes by itself to 
increased losses in years two and three of the scenarios. Increased wage growth is accompanied by 
higher property prices. This increases the banks’ value of collateral. Estimated losses are marginally 
reduced in the first year of the scenarios. This effect is, however, reversed by the rise in property 
values, leaving the estimated losses well below the losses in the baseline scenario. 
A shortcoming in the way we model the loan losses in the corporate sector is that companies exposed 
to foreign competition and companies sheltered from foreign competition are equally influenced by the 
rise in domestic demand caused by increased domestic consumption. In general, internationally 
competing companies will be severely hit by the supply shock through increased wages. The result is 
that losses in the corporate sector are underestimated.  
With a Taylor-like monetary policy response, the interest rate increase causes lower wage growth, 
reduced sales growth and lower property prices. In the first year of the scenario, property prices are 
unchanged compared to the baseline scenario. Accordingly, the estimated losses are unchanged. An 
increase in risk-weighted debt contributes to increased losses in year two of the scenario. The effect of 
a further increase in risk-weighted debt in year three of the scenario is counteracted by an increase in 
property values. Property prices increase in the third year because households’ disposable income 
growth is high (due to a high wage increase and somewhat lower interest rates in this year). Estimated 
losses are accordingly reduced in the final year. 
The supply shock with no monetary policy response causes a reduction in estimated losses compared 
to the baseline scenario in both the corporate and household sector. With a Taylor-like monetary 
policy response, however, losses increase above the level in the baseline scenario in both sectors. Of 
all the scenarios we consider, the supply shock with a monetary response increases risk-weighted 
debt the most. The combination of high wage growth and high interest rates severely worsens the cost 
burden of the corporate sector. In addition, with a supply shock, there may be a potential conflict 
between the objective of monetary policy and financial stability. In the relatively short time frame 
analysed here, monetary policy aimed at achieving the inflation target leads to higher losses in both 
the household and corporate sector. However, in a longer time perspective, this trade-off might be 
somewhat different (for further discussion see Section 5). 
The difference between 1996 and 2001 
The household sector was marginally better positioned in 2001 than in 1996, as measured by 
estimated losses in the first year of the baseline scenarios. Estimated losses (measured as a 
percentage of loans) fell by 0.04 percentage points from 1996 to 2001; see Figure 8. This reduction 
was caused by lower unemployment and an increase in housing wealth. During this period, the debt 
burden and interest rates rose, but not sufficiently to increase the household sector’s losses. With the 
household sector in approximately the same condition along the baseline scenarios during the two 
time periods, the effects of the identical shocks are also almost identical irrespective of whether the 
shocks occur in 1996 or 2001.  
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Figure 4 
Losses in the household sector by type of shock 
Per cent of debt (loss in sector/debt in sector) 
Loss provisions - households
Per cent of debt
Loss provisions - households





























1    Demand shock no Taylor rule (DSNT).     
2    Demand shock with Taylor rule (DST).     
3    Supply shock with Taylor rule 
(SST).   
4  Supply shock no Taylor rule (SSNT). 
Figure 5 
Losses in the corporate sector by type of shock 
Per cent of debt (loss in sector/debt in sector) 
Loss provisions - enterprises
Per cent of debt
Loss provisions - enterprises








































1    Demand shock no Taylor rule (DSNT).     
2    Demand shock with Taylor rule (DST).     
3    Supply shock with Taylor rule 
(SST).   
4  Supply shock no Taylor rule (SSNT). 
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Figure 6 
Total losses by type of shock 
(household and corporate sector) 



































1    Demand shock no Taylor rule (DSNT).     
2  Demand  shock  with  Taylor  rule  (DST).   
3    Supply shock with Taylor rule 
(SST).   
4  Supply shock no Taylor rule (SSNT). 
Figure 7 
Average bankruptcy probabilities in per cent  
for various shocks (risk-weighted debt/debt)  
1    Demand shock no Taylor rule (DSNT).     
2    Demand shock with Taylor rule (DST).     
3    Supply shock no Taylor rule 
(SSNT).   
4  Supply shock with Taylor rule (SST). 
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Figure 8 
Partial effects of the explanatory variables causing a 
lowering of the estimated losses in the household sector 
from baseline scenario in 1996 to baseline scenario in 2001 
Red line shows total effect. Percentage points of loans (dburd: debt burden, 
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In spite of a higher debt burden, the corporate sector was also in a better position in 2001 than in 1996 
measured by the average bankruptcy probability. The corporate sector had been operating profitably 
for five years and the equity ratio had increased by approximately 6 percentage points. This was the 
main factor behind the drop in bankruptcy probability between the two periods; see Figure 9. 
Figure 9 
Changes in key variables influencing companies’ 
risk-weighted debt from 1996 to 2001 















2 Equity ratio Interest rate 
 
1  ROC: return on capital.   
2  ROE: return on equity.  
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As can be seen from the loan loss equation (2) for the corporate sector, property prices play an 
important role in the estimation of loan losses. The growth in house prices along the baseline scenario 
is lower in 2001 than in 1996. This outweighs the impact from the lower bankruptcy probability and 
causes the estimated losses to be higher in 2001 than in 1996. 
The estimated demand shock losses as a percentage of banks’ equity were small; see Figure 10. The 
shock starting in 2001 would have reduced equity more than the shock starting in 1996. The shocks 
would probably not have caused a banking crisis, especially since banks could have raised additional 
capital to improve their capital ratios. 
Figure 10 
Aggregate losses in the demand shock 
















1  Aggregate losses for DSNT as a percentage of banks’ equity at beginning of 96 and 01. 
5.  Conclusions and implications  
Should monetary policy pay special attention to asset prices and the build-up of financial imbalances? 
The answers to this question differ somewhat in the international debate, but it has been pointed out 
that there need not be a conflict between the objectives of maintaining both financial and monetary 
stability. 
First, flexible inflation targeting, where the central bank puts emphasis on smoothing variability in both 
inflation and output, reduces the scope for conflict between the monetary policy objective and financial 
stability. After a shock has brought inflation away from its target, a central bank may choose to bring 
inflation back to target rapidly. Such a strategy, which can be termed strict inflation targeting, would 
typically imply instability in output and employment. By contrast, flexible inflation targeting involves 
applying a somewhat longer horizon to achieve the inflation target. This would normally represent a 
smaller threat to financial stability than a strict inflation targeting regime, as it involves smaller 
fluctuations in production, employment, asset prices and interest rates. 
Second, when assessing how financial stability issues should be dealt with in the conduct of monetary 
policy, it is useful to distinguish between the short and the long term. In this paper we have calculated 
the short-term effects of interest rate changes on the financial sector. Lower interest rates will reduce  
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debt servicing costs and thus reduce the risk of higher loan losses in the short term. In the long term, 
the isolated effect of an expansionary monetary policy will be a faster rise in indebtedness and asset 
prices, which may increase future financial fragility. Higher interest rates have the opposite effect. 
As illustrated in this paper, there seems to be no short-term conflict between financial and monetary 
stability when the economy is facing a typical negative aggregate demand shock. In this case, a 
monetary policy reaction following a standard Taylor rule, which may be interpreted as the response of 
a central bank with a flexible inflation target, would dampen the drop in inflation and production, but 
also reduce banks’ loan losses. Even in the longer term a monetary policy aimed at stabilising inflation 
and output would most likely have a positive impact on financial stability by improving the robustness 
of the banks and their borrowers. 
However, there may also be a risk that in the longer term the lower interest rate may stimulate 
excessive indebtedness and asset prices, so that financial fragility increases. Many firms will have 
excess capacity during an economic downturn, making it less probable that the corporate sector will 
react to an expansionary monetary policy by sharply increasing its debt exposure. The risk may be 
higher for the household sector. A heavily indebted household sector will be vulnerable to adverse 
shocks that may hit the economy in the future. Some households may also face financial problems 
when the economy recovers and interest rates return to their neutral level. The risk of increased 
financial fragility should be weighed against the consequences for activity, inflation and financial 
stability in the short run, if monetary policy is not eased sufficiently to counteract a negative demand 
shock. 
With regard to cost-push shocks stemming from a sudden boost in wages, a conflict between 
monetary and financial stability may arise in the short term. The higher interest rate needed to 
maintain monetary stability will increase debt servicing costs, which may increase credit losses. In our 
scenario, aggregate demand increases immediately due to a positive effect on households’ disposable 
income. Consequently, companies producing for domestic markets will experience reduced pressure 
on operating profits and loan losses are lower than in the baseline scenario. However, in the 
somewhat longer run increased wage costs have a negative impact on the operating results of all 
companies.
12 
Due to the higher inflationary pressures, the monetary policy reaction to such cost shocks would be 
increased interest rates. The positive demand effect is thus partly counteracted, while increased 
interest rates (and a potential appreciation of the currency due to increased interest rate differentials) 
at the same time place an extra burden on enterprises’ expenses. Regarding the cost-push shock, we 
showed that a Taylor-rule monetary policy reaction raises the level of credit losses above the baseline 
scenario. 
In the longer term, this conclusion may be turned around. Without monetary tightening, a continued 
increase in wage growth will have to stop at a later stage, due to longer-term economic dynamics. 
However, the consequences, if not curbed at an early stage, may be higher unemployment due to 
reduced competitiveness of exposed industries, and hence higher credit losses. As debt levels, asset 
prices and hence financial fragility most likely would have increased further in the meantime, the 
consequences for financial stability could even be more severe than if monetary policy was tightened 
immediately. 
The appropriate central bank response when a cost-push shock occurs would of course depend on 
the magnitude of the forecast short-term losses. We found that the losses in these cases were rather 
small from a historical perspective and they would probably not have caused a banking crisis. The 
banks’ buffer capital would have been sufficient to absorb the losses. The costs of not raising the 
interest rate would be related to the deviation of inflation from its target for a longer period, which could 
reduce monetary policy credibility. 
We have run the same set of stress tests on what seemed to be two different periods with regard to 
financial vulnerability. When concerned with financial stability, the main focus is on the level and 
                                                       
12  In particular, companies in exposed industries may experience a deterioration in profitability and competitiveness. 
Unfortunately, the difference between the sheltered and exposed sectors is not modelled within the micro-based SEBRA 
framework. If it were, we could have separated the effects of increased private consumption between domestic/sheltered 
industries and exposed industries.  
BIS Papers No 22  427
 
increase in debt and asset prices. But other variables are also important. The household sector is 
particularly affected by lower unemployment in 2001 relative to 1996. This offsets the negative impact 
of other factors like the higher debt burden. 
Growth in the debt burden was stronger for enterprises than for households in the period between 
1996 and 2001. As with households, this was accompanied by an improving economy that increased 
the equity ratio of firms and thus strengthened their ability to withstand shocks. The level of the 
average bankruptcy probability fell slightly. 
These results show that a sole focus on debt and asset prices may be too narrow when assessing the 
financial fragility of households and enterprises. It is important to include other factors that may have 
an impact on the different sectors’ debt servicing capacity. 
Also, the chosen years may not capture precisely the trough and the peak of the credit cycle. The 
results might have been different if the current year (2003) had been chosen instead of 2001. Debt 
levels have continued to rise and the unemployment rate is now significantly higher. It is possible that 
the financial situation in the corporate sector has deteriorated somewhat. In general, when an 
economy is recovering from a recession, a rise in debt levels and asset prices is not necessarily 
worrying. It is the excessive build-up of debt over time - and clearly over a time period when 
unemployment cannot continuously fall - that gives cause for concern. 
It is clear from our loan loss equations that losses will increase with the level of indebtedness. Hence, 
the weight of preserving the soundness of the banking sector in monetary policy decisions should 
increase with the level of indebtedness. 
Analyses of alternative scenarios are important as part of the monetary policymaking process. With 
the help of stress testing we may analyse the effects on the banking system of different 
macroeconomic scenarios. Within the SEBRA framework, the basis for making this analysis is the 
accounting data for all Norwegian joint stock companies. Also in the future, situations may arise in 
which the financial sector is vulnerable to adverse shocks. Stress testing may give us an early warning 
and monetary policy authorities may then assess whether this should give cause for particular 
concern. 
One shortcoming of using this framework as an “early warning tool” is the fact that the accounting data 
for Norwegian companies lag. For example, data are only available up to 2001. This can, however, be 
partly solved by using projections for companies’ operating results and other key variables. 
Stress testing is a useful tool when analysing developments in the economy and financial stability. 
Such analyses improve the understanding of the interaction between “traditional” macroeconomics 
and financial stability issues. It is, however, important to understand the shortcomings of the method. 
As with all models, we may fail to include important variables. It is also not obvious that models 
calibrated on historical data are relevant for forecasting. 
Finding better indicators for assessing the vulnerability of households, enterprises and financial 
institutions is probably the most important step to improve this kind of analysis. One important step in 
this regard would be to find indicators of bubbles in the property market. For example, it is reasonable 
to expect that the change in property prices following a negative macroeconomic shock would be 
larger the higher property prices are above their “equilibrium” values. The use of house prices as a 
proxy for commercial property prices and the value of collateral may also be solved in a better way. 
An important question is how, and at what cost, monetary policy can curb the build-up of financial 
imbalances (ex ante). A “leaning against the wind” policy requires indicators which give information on 
the build-up of financial imbalances. Although our framework has some shortcomings, it may add to 
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Appendix 1: 
Model for losses in the household sector 
The model is a re-estimation of the model presented in Frøyland and Larsen (2002). The time series 
underlying this model has been revised. We tested various model specifications with alternative 
variable specifications. These alternative specifications did not, however, give any new insights into 
the effects of the shocks. 
Summary 
The estimation sample is: 1978-2002 
  Coefficient   Std error  t-value  t-prob  Partial R
2 
 dburd   3.31404   0.8116    4.08   0.001   0.4547 
 rhouse   –1.44635    0.2499    –5.79   0.000   0.6261 
 R   13.5534   3.002    4.51   0.000   0.5047 
 UMP   31.5508   8.068    3.91   0.001  0.4333 
DUM97  –7.04948   0.3576  –19.7 0.000    0.9511 
 
 sigma  0.322947    RSS  2.08589821 
  log-likelihood   –4.42751    DW   1.96 
  no of observations    25  no of parameters    5 
  mean(lossrel)   –1.63586    var(lossrel)   3.33868 
 
  AR 1-2 test:   F(2,18)  = 0.75655 [0.4836]  
ARCH 1-1 test:  F(1,18) = 0.026134 [0.8734] 
 Normality  test:   X
2(2) = 9.0003 [0.0111]  
 hetero  test:   F(9,10)  = 0.88651 [0.5670]  
 RESET  test:   F(1,19)  = 0.70515 [0.4115]  
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Appendix 2: 
The bankruptcy prediction model SEBRA 
The bankruptcy prediction model SEBRA is a logistic model. For each joint stock company in the 
database (in 2001 the number of companies is approx 140,000) the model produces an estimate of 
the bankruptcy probability. The model is presented in Eklund et al (2001). The explanatory variables 
reflect primarily company-specific information, like earnings, liquidity, financial strength and age, but 
industry-specific information is included in the model, like the average equity ratio and dispersion in 
earnings. A summary of the variables is given below. 
Earnings 
•  Earnings as a percentage of total assets 
Liquidity 
•  Liquid assets less short-term debt as a percentage of operating revenues  
•  Unpaid indirect taxes as a percentage of total assets 
Financial strength 
•  Equity as a percentage of total assets 
•  Dummy variable for book equity less than paid-in equity capital 
•  Dummy variable for dividend payments the last accounting year 
Industry 
•  Industry average for the variable “equity as a percentage of total assets” 
•  Industry average for the variable “trade accounts payable as a percentage of total assets” 
•  Industry standard deviation for the variable “earnings as a percentage of total assets”  
Age 
•  Dummy variable for number of years since establishment 
Size 
•  Total assets   
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